That turned out poorly. Had Kyiv retained its nukes then, it would probably not be fighting an existential war against Moscow’s invading forces today. Ukrainians know that when it comes to security help from its friends, assurances are nice but legally binding promises are better.
That history is pertinent in the aftermath of what the world’s leading industrialized democracies called an “enduring” pledge this month to provide Ukraine with advanced weapons and enhanced training and intelligence sharing. The idea, said the Group of Seven — which consists of the United States, Britain, Canada, Germany, France, Italy and Japan — is that each country would reach a bilateral deal with Kyiv, ensuring it has “a sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future.”
The statement is a critical element in the West’s strategy in Ukraine — to show that the West has the political will to outlast Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, who is bent on a long war in Ukraine in the hope it will erode allies’ resolve and unity. Even if Ukraine remains in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s waiting room, where it has been for 15 years, the West will need to meet Kyiv’s heavy requirement for arms.
The responsibility for doing so rests with the G-7 signatories and also with Ukraine’s smaller allies in Europe. It is especially incumbent on the United States, whose military capacity dwarfs all the others’ combined.
In the White House and in Congress, officials should be drafting a program to ensure Ukraine’s long-term defense. There are several options to protect it from irregular and unpredictable aid cycles.
One template, as we have noted, is Washington’s long-standing military backing for Israel, enshrined in a memorandum of understanding between the two countries, the latest of several that have held up for decades. The current memorandum, signed in 2016, provides $38 billion of military assistance to the Jewish state over 10 years, including $5 billion for missile defense systems.
Those are substantial amounts, but Ukraine will likely need much more. In just the 17 months since Russia’s full-scale invasion, U.S. commitments to Kyiv are approaching $80 billion, including about $45 billion in weapons and other security help. That’s nearly half of Ukraine’s total international assistance.
Washington’s military deal with Israel lacks the force of a treaty, which would require the backing of two-thirds of the Senate. But it does have political support, manifested in year-after-year congressional appropriations.
That model could be replicated in Ukraine’s case and buttressed on Capitol Hill by legislation. A useful prototype is the Taiwan Relations Act, enacted in 1979 to offer security assurances to Taipei after the United States formalized diplomatic relations with China. The Taiwan Relations Act stops short of promising U.S. military intervention in the event of a Chinese invasion. But it does commit Washington to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”
Granted, a memorandum of understanding signed by one administration might not be regarded as binding by its successor, and laws passed by one Congress could be rescinded by a subsequent one. Yet, for now at least, support remains solid for Ukraine in the Democratic-controlled Senate and has held steady in the face of bills attacking aid by a handful of Republicans in the GOP-controlled House of Representatives.
The European Union is considering a new fund worth roughly $22 billion to help arm Ukraine over the next four years. That’s a good start toward making the West’s commitment more enduring.
The Biden administration and Congress can and should follow suit by giving teeth to the G-7 promise to protect Ukraine from Moscow’s predations. Ukraine’s fight against Russia is central to the West’s interests in driving back an unprovoked aggression that threatens the pillars of the world’s law-based order.
