The pressing need to square that strategic circle — to provide Ukraine with muscular long-term military assurances short of NATO’s ironclad security guarantee — is not lost on the president, nor on his main transatlantic partners. For now, their solution is to extend a set of promises in the form of bilateral deals to arm Kyiv to the teeth.
That might be a sensible stopgap, although it comes as a bitter disappointment to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who said of NATO’s position, and the continued absence of any membership schedule, that “uncertainty is weakness.” He later made more conciliatory statements, saying he’d received assurances Ukraine is on a path to joining the alliance. Yet Western leaders are keenly aware they need to demonstrate — both to the Ukrainian people and to Russian President Vladimir Putin — that real measures are required to back up their rhetorical commitment to defend Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” as Mr. Biden likes to say.
There was some encouraging progress in that regard at this week’s summit in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius, which ended Wednesday. There is also much more that has to be done.
One important measure was the establishment of an 11-member coalition of European countries to train Ukrainian pilots to fly U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets, a process that will take at least six months. The next step should be for Washington to authorize their use in battle, for without more robust air combat capability Kyiv will be increasingly hard-pressed to defend itself against Russia’s onslaught.
Another step forward was Sweden’s probable entry into the alliance, after an apparent agreement by NATO member Turkey to lift its veto. That, along with Finland’s accession earlier this year, expands the bloc’s military brawn and strategic depth. It helps turn the Baltic Sea, at Russia’s northwestern edge, into what officials call a “NATO lake.”
It was also important that France, following Britain’s lead, said it would provide Ukraine with long-range cruise missiles, capable of precision strikes at a range up to 155 miles, meaning they could hit targets far behind Russian lines in Ukraine. French sources said the missiles, known as SCALPs, will be delivered on the condition that Ukraine not use them to hit targets in Russia; that would not rule out attacks on military sites in Russian-occupied Crimea, which is Ukrainian territory under international law.
In a similar vein, Mr. Zelensky has pleaded with the Biden administration to provide U.S. surface-to-surface guided missiles called ATACMS, whose range is nearly 200 miles. After more than a year of hesitation, the White House is now seriously considering that request. It has been made more urgent as Ukraine intensifies its counteroffensive against heavily dug-in Russian forces in a campaign that some U.S. officials believe is progressing too slowly.
In Vilnius, U.S. and other officials said members of the Group of Seven leading industrial nations, which includes Britain, France, and Germany as well as the United States, would formulate individual agreements to provide Ukraine with a years-long flow of heavy arms, along with training and intelligence. The real test will be in the details and execution: Which weapons will be supplied? In what quantities and over what period of time? Supplied by which countries? And with what political or legal guarantees?
The answers will shape the West’s long-term investment in Kyiv’s military might, and its ability to continue resisting Russia’s aggression.
To dissuade Mr. Putin from the course he is on, the status quo will not suffice. No doubt, the West’s assistance has been substantial — roughly $180 billion in military and other aid so far, about half of it from the United States. That has been sufficient, along with Ukrainians’ own resolve and courage, to halt Russia’s advance and chip away at bits of land it has occupied. But it is increasingly clear that it might not be adequate to the task of driving Moscow’s forces off much of the nearly 20 percent of Ukrainian territory they still hold.
Mr. Putin is convinced that a frozen war is in his favor — that “Ukraine fatigue” will subvert Western resolve; that time is on his side; and, in his best-case scenario, that Donald Trump will win a second term and end U.S. aid to Kyiv. The West’s way to upend his calculus is to prove its own will is unbending.
NATO said the right things in Vilnius about helping protect Ukraine for years to come. Now the alliance’s job is to show that its pledge amounts to more than words.
