Ukraine is unlikely to receive the clarity it seeks about when it will join NATO. Although Kyiv recognizes that accession would not be immediate, it seeks a positive signal — one that does not appear to be in the offing.
This disappointment should not be cause for despair. Framing Ukraine’s long-term security solely around the rigid binary of NATO membership is unnecessary at this stage in the war. It would set unrealistic expectations for what is possible in the near term and put both Ukraine and NATO in an avoidable bind.
Here’s why: If Ukraine cannot liberate its entire territory, either it would have to resign itself to indefinite territorial partition, as West Germany did when it entered NATO in 1955, or the alliance would need to water down its collective defense guarantee in Article 5 to avoid ending up at war with Russia. Worse, the debate sends a dangerous message to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Ukraine is up for grabs so long as it remains outside the alliance.
The option being considered ahead of next week’s summit does an end-run around this impasse. Western leaders are drafting a set of formal commitments to Ukraine’s self-defense, modeled after what the United States has done for Israel since the 1970s. These pledges would ensure the Ukrainian armed forces’ ability to defend their country and rearm after high-intensity combat ends.
The Biden administration should be ambitious with this plan. Together with key European nations, the United States should broker an agreement that would provide the strategic framework for concrete multiyear funding pledges by each signatory. The arrangement should formalize a mechanism through which the signatories can develop joint threat assessments, coordinate policies and prepare contingency plans to surge additional aid to Kyiv if it were attacked in the future. The plan should also help Ukraine rebuild its once-flourishing defense manufacturing sector, which is key to sustaining its military over the long term.
The West should commit to equipping Ukraine with superior technology and intelligence, as well as capabilities to match or negate the obvious advantages that come with Russia’s size. A similar U.S. obligation to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over its potential rivals could provide a useful template. It is not a perfect analogy, not least because Ukraine is a nonnuclear state facing down a nuclear superpower. Still, like Israel, Ukraine is growing into a serious regional power. It has already fielded a credible force and inflicted serious costs on Russia. Under Western tutelage, the Ukrainian military will grow more sophisticated; over time, Putin or a successor would be less confident that a future invasion would succeed.
Such an arrangement would not be seen as a consolation prize. It would be the most substantial commitment of its kind since the United States helped the war-ravaged nations of Western Europe rebuild and rearm at the onset of the Cold War. In essence, it would constitute a Marshall Plan for the Ukrainian military, with the United States and Europe contributing in equal measure. Its impact on today’s European security order could be similarly transformative.
Some might worry about the cost of such an endeavor. But the United States’ interest in discouraging aggression and territorial expansion is clear. If the outcome of Russia’s invasion is a robust Ukrainian military, then the United States will have signaled a powerful deterrent to other would-be aggressors. Doing so without placing U.S. troops in harm’s way is money well spent.
A capable Ukrainian military enhances NATO’s security, too. Pentagon planners have long fretted about how to defend the alliance’s eastern flank from a Russian attack without stationing hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in Europe, as was the case during the Cold War. Ukraine’s military is tying down significant Russian manpower and resources near Russia’s southwestern border, blunting the conventional threat Moscow could conceivably pose to NATO allies. The United States should double down on this strategy, recognizing the pivotal role that a strong Ukraine can play in the security of Central and Eastern Europe.
Most important, a formal Western commitment to Ukraine’s long-term capabilities could help shorten the war and bring about a just and lasting peace more quickly. With the Russian military unable to subordinate Ukraine, Putin’s current strategy rests on his hope that the West will grow tired of supporting Kyiv. Only by signaling its intention to continue arming Ukraine for the long haul can the West convince Putin that his forces’ advantages will erode, and that he cannot win the war.
Once the contours of a long-term U.S. commitment come into focus, the Biden team must urgently work with Congress to codify it. For inspiration, Congress can look to its past efforts to legislate the parameters of long-term support to Israel and Taiwan. An unambiguous U.S. legal commitment to Ukraine is a necessary step in credibly asserting the West’s staying power.
Finally, this arrangement need not — and should not — be an alternative to eventual NATO membership. Rather, its goals ought to be boosting Ukraine’s security while helping the country move toward interoperability with the alliance until its path to membership becomes clear, deferring tricky territorial issues for another day.
The Ukrainian people are bravely defending their country in a war they did not seek. Western leaders must recognize that Ukraine’s security and Europe’s security are inextricably linked. It is time to show Putin that his waiting game is doomed to fail.
